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Don DeLillo’s prose presents a consistent criticism of today’s culture as 
a system programmed to produce death. Having dissolved all essences, the 
culture of today finds it hard to summon conviction behind its values. 
Searching for it, the culture engages in games of descriptions which tend 
toward paranoias of secrecy. Alternatively, trying to exorcise its horrors, 
the culture reveals its secrets in a process of endless multiplication of 
representations. Here all meanings are soon preempted, all difference and 
defining contours dissolved, while the self is eager to accept easy propositions 
and become amorphous. Both tendencies result in fascination with cruelty 
and death. While in the novels preceding Underworld DeLillo analyses and 
identifies this double bind, in his last book he makes an effort to suggest 
a remedy to it. His use of the themes of the bodily develops a consistent 
m etaphor of strength, which resides in the bodily as the very substance of 
life. At the same time, the novelist suggests that, in order to be preserved, 
this substance should remain undisclosed.
I am going to discuss DeLillo’s understanding of cultural dilemmas in 
the light of the philosophy of Richard Rorty. In Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity Rorty proposes an analysis of the present state of consciousness 
which aptly corresponds to DeLillo’s vision of it. It is the world in which 
humanity for the first time in history sees itself as a coincidental offshoot 
o f evolution, unfounded on any metaphysical concept beyond social or 
historical chance. It faces the consequences of living in the advanced 
Enlightenment which has negated its initial premises and annulled all 
foundations. The major issues converging in DeLillo and Rorty are language 
and self. Rorty starts by de-divinizing these concepts and presenting them 
as purely historicist constructs which do not imitate essences. They are 
received cultural textures, “webs of belief and desire.” Occasionally, the 
texture will be woven radically anew in an act of strong poetic creation,
giving impetus to progress. Rorty’s protagonist is someone called a liberal 
ironist. As an ironist, this person accepts happily the contingent character 
of the vocabulary in which she describes her self-image. As a liberal, she 
embraces one primal value: the avoidance of cruelty. However, the value 
itself is but a choice, a poetic creation, another experiment in the evolution 
o f thought.
Rorty claims that there is no neutral ground from which to argue for 
or against the vocabulary he offers. We cannot step outside the discourse 
and summon a proof whose source would be located beyond it. All we 
have is descriptions competing within the discourse to which they should 
be admitted indiscriminately. Thus, Rorty can only hope that, with time, 
his description will prevail. Presenting the clash of descriptions in more 
detail, DeLillo’s novels add a new perspective to the picture outlined by 
Rorty, pointing to pathological side effects of the wholly arbitrary struggle 
between vocabularies. While Rorty encourages us to view the lack of 
foundations as a fact opening up humanity’s creative potential, for DeLillo’s 
characters, in Underworld as well as in the novels preceding it, it is a source 
of disfiguring anxieties. Eventually, we will see how DeLillo’s fears prove 
stronger than Rorty’s optimistic belief in poetized progress.
DeLillo’s characters are faced with the need to find modes of adjustment 
in the world of contingencies. Some characters will undertake various 
measures to escape contingency seeking refuge in such concepts as History, 
Reason, or the essential Self. Apart from confronting the traum a of JF K ’s 
assassination -  the event that shattered the sense of what is real and shared 
by the official discourse and the individual subject1 — Libra portrays an 
attem pt to find essence through History. DeLillo’s Oswald is a social misfit. 
To overcome isolation, he longs to become a part of larger historical 
processes. But the passage to History seems to require a channel of state 
agencies and political organizations. Seeking a transcendental process, 
Oswald finds the game of conspiracy and secrecy. Agents of KGB, CIA, 
FBI, and American right-wing organizations all find roles for Oswald in 
the games they play. Their fantasies clash with Oswald’s and prevail as 
truer to the idea of the free play of redescriptions, exemplifying a recurring 
pattern in DeLillo. Unwittingly, Oswald succumbs to the paranoia of 
plotting and conspiracy. He ends up as a willing tool in the hands of 
people who hold views opposite to his. DeLillo leaves no illusions: there 
is no capitalized History beyond human visions and obsessions.
Another chance for an essence seems to lurk in the concept of the Core 
Self. The promise to hit upon it is afforded by the idea of isolation. One
1 For a detailed discussion o f the consequences o f  Kennedy assassination on the individual 
consciousness and the novel, see Federman (1147-1149).
of DeLillo’s most haunting images is the desert or its alternative version: 
a small closed room. In The Names, an archeologist linguist Owen Brademas, 
a man who has spent his life unraveling the mystery of identity, ends up 
in a sparsely lit room, somewhere in India. In Mao II, the writer Bill Gray 
finds himself self-imprisoned in his study, hoping to escape the web of the 
world’s descriptions and reach the core of his creative self.
Just like the hunt of History, the search for the Core Self also results in 
adverse effects. Rather than clarity of mind, DeLillo’s hermits find obsession 
and weariness. In his cell in India, Owen Brademas knows he is dying. 
His Reasonable Self is smothered by the knowledge of its contingent 
finality. To the eternal question of identity Owen provides the truest answer 
possible: “ [I am] no one” (Names 292), but he finds no remedy against the 
dissipating gloom of this realization. Neither does Bill Gray, who understands 
that self-imprisonment only produces disintegration. Bill’s talent abandons 
him; he loses the sense of the language and cannot write any more. Instead 
of the Essential Self, isolation produces hallucinations.
The mere knowledge of non-essentiality results in apathy and stag­
nation. That is why the contingent self is compelled to legitimize its 
existence by devising meanings out of the material afforded by the world 
and other selves so that they become the missing substance. Initially, the 
elements are combined at random in the process which DeLillo sees as 
obsessive plotting. The rooms in which DeLillo places his hermits in­
variably get filled with the records of these obsessions. In Libra, Oswald 
is summoned to comment on the behavior of Francis Gary Powers, the 
captured U2 pilot. Oswald watches Powers sit in the cell at a small table 
fully engrossed in drawing straight lines on a piece of paper. This is how 
the restless mind starts to project its incoherent buzz outward. With time 
the lines on the paper will get organized into a larger structure: a jou ­
rnal, or a calendar. Empty rooms inevitably get smaller, stuffed with 
material. Bill Gray of Mao II  is surrounded by notes and maps represen­
ting the progress o f his novel. But the web of possible connections and 
developments is endless, and the book turns into a roomful o f files. 
Drawing and organizing files is DeLillo’s m etaphor of the restless self 
devising its projects, and his most exemplary characters here are the CIA 
agents and anti-Castro activists of Libra. “Once you start a file,” says 
one of them, “it’s just the matter of time before the material comes
pouring in” (Libra 143). Running files and devising conspiracies is com­
pulsive:
Stalking a victim is a way o f organizing one’s loneliness, m aking a network out
o f  it, a fabric o f connections. Desperate men give their solitude a purpose and a destiny
(Libra 147).
In DeLillo we learn that all institutional activities are driven by this 
psychological imperative. Agents of various political affiliations all engage 
in games of fantasies. Espionage becomes a m etaphor for all our systems 
in their never ceasing effort to recreate the substance. Even religion 
supposedly the noblest of our pursuits after essence, is flawed, as it can 
never be satiated: the absolute evades us with the flow of ever-changing 
rephrasings. As a character says in The Names'.
Wherever you will find empty land, there are men who try to get closer to God. They
6y Wil1 lake f° ° d’ lhey wiU 8 °  away from women . . . When 
Mohammed was, there still were men who went away from him. Closer to G od, always 
in their mind to remember God. . . . Always some men go away (Names 149).
Thus in all spheres of human activity, be it religion or politics, people 
weave their fantasies until these become realities in the world. DeLillo’s 
characters are frequently faced with a weird impression of finding reflections 
of their most secret drives in the vistas of the public discourse. The visible 
world is a clear message communicating what used to be hidden in us. We 
might easily exchange intimations with our friends sending them newspaper 
clippings, as a background character in Libra does. Hence, too, the awe 
with which Libra’s characters regard Lee Harvey Oswald on the TV screen. 
There is a deep and tense accord. Oswald’s look is:
. . .  a way o f telling us that he knows who we are and how we feel, that he has brought 
our perceptions and interpretations into his sense o f the crime (Libra 447)
Here DeLillo’s novels seem to question an important tenet of Rorty’s 
model which turns on the separation of the private and the public. Rorty 
writes:
For my pnvate purposes, I may redescribe you and everybody else in terms which have 
nothing to do with my attitude toward your actual or possible suffering. M y private 
purposes, and the part o f  my final vocabulary which is not relevant to my public actions 
are none o f  your business. But as I am a liberal, the part o f  my final vocabulary which 
is relevant to such actions requires me to become aware o f all the various ways in which 
all the human beings whom I might act upon can be humiliated (91).
The assumption is that we could structure our public discourse keeping 
it free from the idiosyncrasies of our private self. There is no place for 
such hope in the world of DeLillo’s novels. Here, the private extends 
continuously into the public, and the public is just a larger projection of 
our most intimate drives. All culture is idiosyncratic texture.
As we have seen, those who reject this reality end up used by others 
or suffering disintegration. However, DeLillo points to one other mode of 
adaptation, ecstatic affirmation of the texture. His most mind-compelling
creations are charismatic madmen who joyfully accept the free play of 
cultural descriptions. The more intense the play of descriptions, the happier 
they feel. M urray Siskind of White Noise reveres the reality of the consumer 
world simulacra. He feels elated by the atmosphere of the mall and greedily 
absorbs all aspects of the mass culture. Similarly, in Libra, David Ferrie 
finds thrilling pleasure in tracing the impact of coincidence on human life.
Characters like Siskind or Ferry, wallowing in the profusion of patterns, 
tend to mysticize them. M urray Siskind talks at length about the mystical 
quality of the supermarket. David Ferrie laughs in Oswald’s face hearing 
the worn-out Marxist depreciation of religion. To this Ferrie replies:
Dum b. Shortsighted. You have to understand there are things that run deeper than 
politics. . . . Penance was the major sacrament o f  my adolescence. I used to haunt the 
confession boxes. I went from one to the other. I told my sins, I made up sins, 1 said 
my act o f contrition. . . Only a fool rejects the need to see beyond the screen (Libra 320).
Ferrie and Siskind do not reject this need. To the contrary, although 
they are ironists, they re-divinize the world by ritualizing its descriptions. 
But rituals made of fully contingent material are in desperate need of 
validation. The only non-contingent entity which might inject meaning into 
fictitious constructs is death. DeLillo’s ironists are attracted to the mysterious 
and the morbid. For them, all activity naturally seeks its validation in the 
act of killing. The sect in The Names, otherwise founded on a purely 
arbitrary mental combination, validates its own existence through ritual 
murder. In White Noise Siskind will push the novel’s protagonist Jack 
Gladney to kill; in Libra, Ferrie works on Oswald, making him believe in 
the end that he needs to shoot the president.
DeLillo’s madmen frequently point to irrational, uncanny forces shaping 
our actions. In Libra, David Ferrie tells Oswald that although the conspirators 
have been trying to manipulate his life, they did not arrange for his job 
at the book depository. Neither did they have power to arrange the route 
of the presidential motorcade. He says:
There’s something else that’s generating the event. A  pattern outside experience . . . (Lib­
ra  384).
DeLillo teases us as to the source of this paranoia: is it him, his 
characters, or us? Here is Frank Lentricchia on Libra:
DeLillo does not do what the media right convicts [sic!] him o f  doing -  imply that all 
Americans are would-be murderous sociopaths. He has presented a politically far more 
unsettling vision o f  normalcy, o f  an everyday life so utterly enthralled by the fantasy 
selves projected in the media as our possible third person . . . that it makes little useful 
sense to speak o f  sociopathology or o f a lone gunman (204).
However, if the electronically processed image emanates a causal aura, 
it remains to be explained why it produces death and violence.
The prevailing set of metaphors in DcLillo’s latest, most ambitious 
novel Underworld is based on the clash between the urge to hide and to 
reveal. I he private and public paranoias of the cold war era were produced 
by the former drive. However, at some point, the opposite impulse seems 
to take over. Part I ol Underworld opens with a conceptual arts project in 
which a former bomber fleet is displayed on a desert plateau and painted 
in bright colors. It is the open, democratic culture appeasing, at last, its 
former hidden horror. The other powerful metaphor of exposure in Underworld 
is waste management. Refuse, personal or cultural garbage, such as nuclear 
waste, shamefully testifying to our ugliest drives, previously kept in secret, 
now contributes to the aesthetics of the age. Toward the end of the novel 
we see people bringing their children to view a waste plant at work, 
absorbing tons of garbage to transform it magically into new products. 
People feel elated by the process.
For DeLillo today’s culture brings all descriptions into view, and reveals 
all secrets. For sure, there are various kinds of secrets. While it is healthy 
for a culture to clarify its political secrecies, delving into the mysteries of 
the very private is counterproductive, and DeLillo especially focuses on the 
cultural impulse to foreground what used to constitute our privacy. Toward 
the end of Underworld the narration records this impulse with acuteness:
They are trading garbage in the commodity pits in Chicago. They are making synthetic 
feces in Dallas. You can sell your testicles to a firm in Russia . . . ( Underworld 804).
The problem is that with all secrets redescribed we lose a crucial 
ingredient of our moral life: intensity. A scarce commodity today, it is 
devoured through restless self-referentiality. As a result, there appears 
a feeling of skepticism which precludes action. A character in The Names says:
The world for thousands o f years was our escape, our refuge. . . . The world was where 
we lived, the self was where we went mad and died. But now the world has made a self 
o f  its own. W hat happens to us now. . . . How do we say the simplest thing without 
falling into a trap? (Names 297)
The image domination is, of course, the major culprit in the process. 
DeLillo fears that the culture of endless multiplication of representation is 
fast-exhaustible. He is nostalgic for the past free from: “frantic repetition 
that exhausts a contemporary event before it has rounded into coherence” 
(“Power” 62). As a result, the image culture turns toward violence, horror 
and death, the only non-contingent entity, in an attem pt to recreate 
meaning. DeLillo’s most generic version of electronic image is the Zapruder
footage, echoed later in the “Texas Highway Killer” episode of Underworld. 
Significantly, both films do not show the killers. Instead, they concentrate 
on victims, on their pain, on the horror of the event. Eventually, DeLillo 
implies, this is all an image does. That is why the force David Ferrie 
demonizes in Libra, and Lentricchia identifies as the media projecting our 
self-conscious third person ego, is ultimately deadly.
Here then is DeLillo’s central dilemma. On the one hand we have the 
consciousness of finality and contingency which brings the reasonable 
Enlightenment self to the dead end of skepticism. An alternative mode of 
adaptation re-divinizes contingency, turning it into a ritual. Here, the 
contingent self will weave its idiosyncrasies until they become a part of 
public institutions in which power is married to secrecy and paranoia, and 
which seek validation through death. This culture’s final product is the 
nuclear destruction horror. On the other hand, the culture of frantic 
proliferation of representations, the culture intent on revealing all secrets, 
exhausts meaning, and is death-bound too.
Underworld brings all strings of this morbid conundrum together. The 
novel might be seen as a meditation on the culture which, unwilling to admit 
its shadowy side, purges itself of it in a process which neuters consciousness. 
A firm voice in DeLillo’s complex discussion warns against the simple 
annihilation of our darker mysteries. Something in the novel seems to be 
implying that they should be wrestled with and contained rather than incinera­
ted by the ubiquitous open discourse. To deliver the admonition, DeLillo looks 
for a m etaphor of strength that will allow us to confront our inescapable 
ugliness; it is to be commanded to produce the necessary ingredient of our 
moral life: desire and intensity. Increasingly, as the novel evolves backward in 
time, this metaphor appears to consist in the full endorsement of the bodily.
1 he treatment of the bodily in Underworld is rooted in the earlier novels 
and can be fully understood only with reference to them. DeLillo’s writing 
features a consistent string of associations between bodily decay linguistic 
decay, and the disintegration of the self. David Ferrie, the man whose 
element is chaos, suffers from an unknown form of cancer. Another 
madman in DeLillo, a baseball memorabilia collector in Underworld named 
Marvin, keeps missing words. Soon, we learn that Marvin also suffers from 
cancer. And again it is a unique form of the disease whose newly made 
up name is not included in dictionaries.
In Mao II, the writer Bill Gray warily traces all his typewriter misspellings. 
He is convinced they signal a growing brain tumor. As we noted earlier, 
Gray s creativity withers away in isolation. The writer is no longer able to 
master his material. Here, the previous dependency seems reversed: amorphous 
mass of language, no longer commanded by the writer’s will, takes the 
shape of a disfigured body. Bill Gray feels physical aversion to his book:
He looked at the sentence, six disconsolate words, and saw the entire book as it took 
occasional shape in his mind, a neutered near-human dragging through the house, 
humpbacked, hydrocephalic, with puckered lips and soft skin, dribbling brain fluid from 
its mouth (M ao 55).
Later we learn that Bill Gray does in fact suffer from an internal disease, 
possibly cancer. Again, bodily decay and disfigured feel of the language 
are interlocked.
In DeLillo, the integrity of one’s relation to language has crucial 
bearing on the person’s actions. The inability to capture the shape of 
written language marks failure in confrontation with the free play of 
descriptions in the outer world. The strength to master language has 
a moral significance. Bill Gray says:
Every sentence has a truth waiting at the end o f  it and the writer learns how to know  
it when he finally gets there. . . . I’ve always seen myself in sentences. I begin to recognize 
myself, word by word, as I work through a sentence. The language o f my books has 
shaped me as a man. There’s a moral force in a sentence when it comes out right. It 
speaks the writer’s will to live (Mao 48).
But as we have seen, Bill Gray loses this integrity. It seems that our 
relationship with language needs some organizing principle, a fulcrum that 
could lift language toward self-integrity and make it a tool for overcoming 
isolation. DeLillo finds it in the mode of communication in which language 
emanates from the presence and consciousness of the bodily.
In Underworld, we see one of the characters, a high school teacher 
Alfred Bronzini, taking full pleasure in a hot bath after the day’s work. 
Relaxed, he comes upon a thought that explains a curious sensation he 
had earlier that day: the taste of a tangerine he had eaten made him think 
of Morocco. Now, Alfred solves the puzzle:
Tangerine, Tanger, Tangier. The port from which the fruit was first shipped to  Europe. 
He felt better now, thank you. H ow language is webbed in the senses ( Underworld 683).
Language is here linked to the bodily sensation. DeLillo would like 
language to match the body, to clad it warmly. The passage ends with the 
statement that: “ Nothing fits the body so well as water.” However, the 
total melting of language into amorphousness of “water” is out of the 
question. The temptation is, of course, the thrill of the “coming out of 
stasis” and the issue is explored in The Names. Owen Brademas, the 
western skeptic, knows there is ecstasy to be found in speaking in tongues, 
the experience corresponding to obliterating oneself in the crowd of 
religious fanatics. However, for DeLillo, merging with the religious crowd 
is not an option; self-dissolution in the rhythms of the religious chant 
cancels the self and, as a result, its darker side remains unrallied.
Entering the chant spares one the ordeal of confronting the ugly in the 
self. Thus the ecstasy of the m antra precludes individual moral life. 
Interestingly, it also separates us from our bodies. Describing the ecstatic 
chant of the Moonies participating in a group marriage at the Yankee 
Stadium, DeLillo writes:
They are forgetting who they are under their clothes, leaving behind all the small banes 
and body woes, the daylong list o f sore gums and sweaty nape and need to pee, ancient 
rumbles in the gut . . .  the fungoid dampness between the toes, the deep spasm near 
the shoulder blade that’s charged with mortal reckoning (Mao 8).
The self retains its individual integrity through linguistic communication 
and bodily consciousness. It is because language rests on the bodily, derives 
intensity from its heat, its purity or filth. Language of integrity comes to 
its full realization through the tone of the voice, through gesture. Frequently, 
DeLillo’s characters, wearied in the struggle for self-definition, find consolation 
in the presence of other people that is both bodily and linguistic. In The 
Names, the narrator James Axton ponders on the rejuvenating atmosphere 
of Athens at night:
People everywhere are absorbed in conversation. Seated under trees . . . they bend 
together over food and drink, their voices darkly raveled in Oriental laments that flow  
from radios . . . Conversation is life, language is the deepest being. We see the patterns 
repeat, the gestures drive the words. It is the sound and picture o f  humans communicating. 
It is talk as a definition o f  itself. Talk (Names 52).
The mystery of the bodily and its deepest impulses are explored fully 
in Part 6 of Underworld. Here, having dug backwards in time, DeLillo 
places the heart of his argument at the end of the novel, against the flow 
of time. The tale returns to the Bronx of the 50’s and we are taken on 
a tour of its streets, following the paths of Alfred Bronzini. The Joycean 
association enriches the scenes. The main interest is located in the life of 
the streets: people work and rest, struggle and desire, live and die. Bronzini 
talks to a waiter, a barber, and a butcher -  professions devoted to the life 
of the body. Raw meat is advertised in shopwindows. Children’s games 
recreate the dram a of death’s chase after life. Tokens of predation, suffering, 
and death are inscribed in the portrait of life. The flavor of the street 
testifies to the truth of the culture that is predatory at its deepest heart, 
and this truth constitutes the reality of the place.
This is also the place where Nick Shay, the novel’s central character, 
lives the youth of desire and aggression. The virile “ realness” of this life 
contrasts vividly with the melancholy of Mr. and Mrs. Shay’s house in 
Phoenix presented in Part I and the Epilogue. Here Nick’s narrative voice 
is subdued by the segregated and calculated order of the consumed life.
The narration is a methodically scanned series of programmed household 
activities interrupted by suspended moments of insight into the absence of 
intensity. The life seems already lived and a shadow of its vigor is sought 
in the past:
I do the books on the new shelves and stand in the living room and look at the carpets
and the wall hangings and I know the ghosts are walking the halls. . . .  I stand helpless
in this desert place looking at the books (Underworld 810).
However, young Nick’s life in the Bronx, “real” as it may be through 
its proximity to blood passions, is clearly purposeless and on its way to 
a catastrophe. Nick’s natural aggression must be shaped and transformed 
if it is to be productive, and the argument for the process is provided in 
the character of the Jesuit, Father Paulus.
Although a background character, Father Paulus expresses the crucial 
voice of DeLillo’s internal discussion. He stands for a full acknowle­
dgement of the great desires of the body -  the sexual and the predatory. 
Asked about the strains of celibacy, Father Paulus confesses unabas­
hedly:
I would like to screw a movie star, Albert . . .  I want to screw her in the worst way
possible and I mean that in every sense (Underworld 672).
Within the same conversation, speaking in turn on the nature of a chess 
master, Paulus states:
The psychology is in the player, not the game. He must enjoy the company o f  danger.
He must have a killer instinct. . . • Willful in the extreme (Underworld 674).
But the desires are acknowledged only to be mastered. Above all, 
Father Paulus stands for the self-discipline of the contained instincts. Such 
is his definition of the fully-conscious moral action. However, it must be 
noted that the containment of desires entails leaving them unrevealed. The 
darkness our souls harbor should remain its mystery if they are to be used 
as fuel for the will. Such is the teaching remaking the shapeless soul of 
Nick Shay and positioning Nick’s further development against the prevalent 
cultural current of the times.
The revolutionary impulse to bring the dark mysteries into the open 
and nautralize them gained tremendous momentum and produced an 
adverse effect of sterilizing the culture, which DeLillo places mostly in the 
America of the 80’s and 90’s. The urge to reach for every mystery, to 
redescribe it and level it with the rest of the discourse, dictated by the 
intention to tame the unpredictable in man, has purged the culture of all 
conviction. DeLillo’s metaphor for this state is the obliteration of the
bodily. Bodily filth and heat pervading the Prologue -  set in the early 50’s
-  make it contrast vividly with the four decade distant opening of Part I :
This is a car assembled in a work area that’s completely free o f human presence. N ot 
a spot o f  mortal sweat . . . The system flows forever onward, automated to priestly 
nuance . . . H ollow bodies coming in endless sequence. There’s nobody on the line with 
caffeine nerves or a history of clinical depression (Underworld 63).
When, two chapters later, we see Nick and his colleagues at a baseball 
game, the game is a hushed display behind the glass of a restaurant 
window, a mediated spectacle whose former substance seems screened and lost.
W hat remains are the creations of the bodiless mind projected onto the 
desert of total arbitrariness and contingency. The human mind, formerly 
the source of beauty and organizing energy pondered upon by Bronzini in 
Part 6, has seen through itself and grown monstrous. DeLillo is clearly 
wary of the mind’s terrific power to materialize its reveries; he implies that 
we have lost the ability to check this power. His characters often inquire 
into the method of mental projections as if trying to decode the meaning 
of the surrounding culture. What they see around them is what the mind 
has become: a shameless, amorphous, paranoid web of boundless connections, 
without the defining contour, deprived of all difference. In this mass 
everything is true and possible: miracles are frequent and easy. For DeLillo 
the unbounded freedom of discourse in which all descriptions are admitted 
with no restrictions, and no pre-determined order, so much advocated by 
Rorty,2 distorts the culture into a formless chant -  white noise.
It is the hard questions concerning the origins of civilization that this 
culture is trying to evade. The springs of civilization are dark and polluted. 
In Underworld, there is a continuous link between the lofty steel and glass 
metropolis, the trademark of our times, and its vast stinking landfills. 
Garbage is at once the product of civilizational progress and its cause, as 
an impetus to the organizing impulse. Civilization is bound inextricably to 
its Other: ugliness, as an unavoidable product of the civilization building 
testifies to the fact that the process stems from elements opposite and alien 
to it. The metaphor of garbage, signaled in White Noise and Libra, becomes 
central in Underworld, in which it complements DeLillo’s treatment of the 
bodily. Nick Shay is the one who works to “contain garbage” and the 
profession requires a special state of the spirit. DeLillo’s characters feel
2 Speaking o f the shape o f  discourse which would be m ost useful in our liberal society, 
Rorty warns against a situation in which certain descriptions would be disqualified as a rule: 
“It is central to the idea o f a liberal society that, in respect to words as opposed to  deeds, 
persuasion as opposed to force, anything goes. This openmindedness should . . .  be fostered. 
. . . for its own sake. A liberal society is one which is content to call 'true' whatever the upshot 
o f  such [unrestricted] encounters turns out to be" (51-52 -  Rorty’s italics).
that the pungent stench of garbage heaps is a challenge to the constitution 
of their selves; it is a reminder of the ugly which partly makes us. Beauty, 
order and civilization happen when our primal ugliness is admitted, kept 
within limits, and mastered. However, it takes more than pure mind to 
confront it: it takes intensity which the self-conscious mind annuls.
If our world is a game, DeLillo implies, it needs will to be played. The 
world as a fact beyond our consciousness, like pieces on the chessboard, 
is still and meaningless in itself. As Father Paulus says, “ the psychology 
is in the player, not the game” (Underworld 674). This psychology must 
take the challenge of the ugly that underlies it, and the task is too much 
for M att Shay, Nick’s brother, who has to abandon chess unable to cope with:
. . . what is always there beneath the spatial esthetics and the mind-modeling rigor of 
the game, beneath the forevisional bursts o f insight -  an autoworld o f pain and loss 
(Underworld 457).
Such is DeLillo’s version of the civilizational discontent. Those strong 
enough to exercise self-discipline, to sublimate the instincts, and not to 
yield to the paranoias of easy belief, gain, like Nick Shay, integrity and 
some degree of independence from the world, but may be burnt by the 
struggle. Nick Shay is DeLillo’s most complete character, a “serious m an” 
who is determined to “live in the real,” but his success is costly. To cling 
to the identity of one’s body, humbled by its dark mystery, is to consent 
to one’s separateness and the world’s necessity; it is to deny oneself the 
sudden joy and communal spirit whose power sometimes overcomes the 
physical world’s rigid laws.
Sister Edgar, DeLillo’s example of religious faith grown sterile by the 
lack of desires, does not find strength to withstand such denial, her true 
faith distorted, and decides she has witnessed a miracle, a reductive 
presumption from the point of view of the Catholic canon. Seeking 
alleviation of pain after the murder of the homeless girl Esmeralda, she 
decides the girl’s face shows miraculously in the billboard advertising 
orange juice. Such screen for the display is by no means accidental; the 
advertisement produces a carefully designed aura and the reader recalls the 
making of it described earlier in the novel (531-532). The thoroughly 
behaviorist prediction of the consumer response underlying the composition 
of colors and shapes is spell-binding and its success means subjugation of 
the human will. What Sister Edgar does witness is the aura of the nebulous 
culture -  the false faith to which she succumbs. Characteristically, at this 
instant, she becomes:
. . . nameless for a moment, lost to the details o f personal history, a disembodied fa c t  
in liquid form, pouring into the crowd (Underworld 823 -  italics mine).
DeLillo’s focus on the bodily is reflected in the language of Underworld: 
Prologue and Part 6, where our measuring ourselves against our deepest 
bodily nature is mainly developed, feature a change in language and style. 
However, the writer searches for this aesthetics only in Underworld’s 
chronological beginning, running against time,3 which shows that DeLillo 
turns away from the liberal progress that Rorty praises as decreasing the 
amount of cruelty in the world.4 It is interesting to note that Rorty faces 
the same dilemma as DeLillo: finding conviction in one’s views despite the 
knowledge of their contingency. Rorty’s answer is the “poetized” culture 
in which truths are made, not discovered. But since his other goal is 
solidarity, he wants poiesis without pain and exploitation,5 and his measure 
is the close private/public split.
DeLillo finds the split implausible and is unwilling to give up all 
essences. His writing looks for an ultimate essence, the only non-contin­
gent entity: the dark and the ugly residing in the bodily. It is the one 
thing that should not be incorporated into the Rortean web of free 
redescriptions. The body is the ultimate reality -  it is the clock of our 
life and the house of life and death (235). The body dies constantly, but 
DeLillo implies that the bodily -  the source of our failures -  also makes 
our beauty possible. Moreover, the body’s physicality provides for our 
separateness; it defines us and produces the vital difference. Confronting 
the body’s ugliness and its limitations is the first step to nourish the 
will. This confrontation is dangerous: the results cannot be predicted. 
But the attempt to eliminate this unpredictability produces a false tran­
quility. W hat DeLillo sees in The Web at the end of Underworld is 
a fake quiet -  bodylessness washed of all argument. Underworld has 
a virtual ending: its final word -  “peace” -  appears on a computer 
screen. The ring is sarcastic: this “peace” sounds rather like M iltonian 
Satan’s exit hiss.
3 Here is DeLillo on his language: “Something I discovered after I finished writing the 
book . . .  is that much of [it] is nearly saturated with compound words, many o f them which 
I invented or grafted together. In Part Six, suddenly the language is a bit different. It’s a bit 
simpler. I t s  more visceral" (Howard 15 -  italics mine).
4 Discussing differences between Foucault and himself, Rorty observes: “A large part of 
F oucault s work . . . consists in showing how the patterns o f  acculturation characteristic o f 
liberal societies have imposed on their members the kind o f constraints o f which older, 
premodern societies had not dreamed. He is not, however, willing to  see these constraints as 
compensated for by a decrease in pain. . . . My disagreement with Foucault amounts to the 
claim that this decrease does, in fact, compensate for those constraints” (63).
5 It seems a difficult goal to attain. Critics and poets frequently point to the exploitative 
side of poetry. Here is a random example from Frederick Turner: “For a highly gifted poet 
to export his productions to others is a form o f imperialism. . . . anyone who is moved by 
another to see the world in a different way is the victim o f  exploitation (370).
Insisting in Underworld that there are mysteries in us which we should 
not dare touch, Don DeLillo proposes an argument which is Catholic at 
its roots. It is Protestantism with its shift of the responsibility for faith 
from external hierarchy to the individual that placed a tremendous pressure 
on the sell to boldly explore its darkness and exorcise its filth. As Sacvan 
Bercovitch observes, the impulse was directed against individuality residing 
in the imperfection of the flesh (14-15). On this view, Catholicism regards 
the mystery of man with more humbleness. DeLillo’s vision considers this 
humbleness as necessary. We need it, he implies, as a corrective perspective 
without which the frantic efforts to overcome our limitations tend to 
disfigure our perceptions. For DeLillo, then, our sanity and existence 
require that we refrain from pursuing certain regions of self-knowledge. In 
this vision morality, will, and life are enabled by preserving limits to 
knowledge. Existence continues only with a certain amount of the unknown.
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